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I.    INTRODUCTION 
The ethical limitations on an attorney’s ability to assume financial 
responsibility for an adverse attorney’s fees award against one’s client is a 
topic of first impression in Texas.  Because of this, attorneys who might 
wish to undertake this type of fee arrangement do so at their own peril.  And 
while it is not currently widespread, it is possible that adopting the use of 
this practice would help expand access to the courts of justice.  Plaintiffs 
who would otherwise forego bringing claims out of fear of being saddled 
with adverse attorney’s fees awards would gain an opportunity for redress.   
Critics of this practice will be quick to point out that guaranteeing adverse 
attorney’s fees in a civil setting constitutes a breach of the Texas ethics rules.  
However, such is not automatically the case, and interpretations such as 
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these are a narrowly misguided approach to the rules.  Therefore, it is the 
purpose of this Comment to further supplement and illuminate the several 
ethical underpinnings of guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees in a civil 
setting.   
Like many states, Texas has inculcated its ethical rules within standardized 
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.1  Texas patterns its disciplinary 
rules off the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.2  
Because many other states follow a similar practice, their rules often parallel 
the form and intent of the Texas rules.  It is due to these similarities that 
Texas can—and should—look to sister state jurisdictions for added 
guidance when deciding whether to adopt the practice of contingent adverse 
attorney’s fee agreements.   
II.    TEXAS’ RULES 
A. Disciplinary Rule of Conduct 1.04 
Being that the scenario proposed by this Comment is a form of 
contingency, Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.04 applies.3  
Rule 1.04 provides the substantive regulations involving the fees that 
attorneys may charge their clients.4  The rule starts off with the notion of 
unconscionability and reasonableness5 and lists eight general non-
exhaustive factors a court may consider when determining the 
reasonableness of a fee.6  The area of the rule that is of most importance to 
this analysis is found in subsection (d), and concerns itself exclusively with 
contingent fees.7  Subsection (d) provides: 
A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service 
is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by 
paragraph (e) or other law.  A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and 
shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined.  If there is to be 
 
1. See generally TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (outlining the disciplinary rules of professional conduct in Texas). 
2. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (providing guidance 
on how states should structure their disciplinary rules).  
3. See generally TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.04 (addressing ethical 
standards relating to fees). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at R. 1.04(a). 
6. Id. at R. 1.04(b). 
7. Id. at R. 1.04(d). 
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a differentiation in the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the 
lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, the percentage for each shall 
be stated.  The agreement shall state the litigation and other expenses to be 
deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted 
before or after the contingent fee is calculated.  Upon conclusion of a 
contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written 
statement describing the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, 
showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.8   
Like the drafters of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 
this Comment realizes the important role of contingency fees while also 
acknowledging the precarious situation it can easily place clients in when 
abused.   
The main purpose of contingency fee contracts is to provide 
representation to clients who would otherwise be incapable of affording 
legal services.9  Contingency fees protect the client from suffering a net 
financial loss should they fail to win their case.10  The upside for attorneys 
is they can charge higher fees than normally incurred under an hourly or up-
front fee arrangement because of this increased risk.11  This is exactly why 
an attorney might choose to guarantee the risk of adverse attorney’s fees.  
The higher the risk, the more reasonable it is for an attorney to charge a 
higher percentage.   
It is at this point where one can begin to see some of the possible issues 
which might arise in contingent fee contracts.  There are some, like 
Professor Ted Schneyer, who might believe that contingency fees inherently 
give rise to situations which are not within the best interest of clients.12  And 
while these issues are certainly possible, they are not inherently likely simply 
due to the nature of percentage fee agreements.   
 
8. Id. at R. 1.04(d). 
9. See Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Tex. 2006) (citing Arthur 
Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997)) (explaining the ways attorneys 
and courts can help indigent clients); Harold See, An Alternative to the Contingent Fee, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 
485, 490 n.14 (1984); see also Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the 
Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 43 (1989) (describing the justifications for contingent fee 
agreements). 
10. Hoover Slovacek LLP, 206 S.W.3d at 561. 
11. Id. (citing Arthur Andersen & Co., 945 S.W.2d at 818). 
12. See Ted Schneyer, Legal-Process Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyers’ Contingent Fee Contracts, 
47 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 388–94 (1998) (prognosticating percentage contingency fee agreements give 
rise to agency issues, encouragement of frivolous claims, subornation of perjury, etc.). 
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The Texas Ninth Court of Appeals similarly voiced its concern for 
unilateral option provisions which shift the agreement from an hourly fee 
agreement to a contingent fee agreement.13  The ninth court correctly held 
that unilateral option provisions lessen the legitimate justifications for 
contingent fee’s higher payout.14  In the situation posited by the ninth court, 
the client must pay either the hourly rate upon losing or a percentage fee 
upon success.  This however is a simple issue to fix through proper contract 
drafting.  The solution is to create a guaranteed contingency which actually 
benefits the client.  A representation agreement needs to merely specify that 
the client will simply pay an hourly fee if his or her action is successfully 
disposed of in a short enough period of time as to make a percentage fee 
unconscionable.   
B. Disciplinary Rule of Conduct 1.08 
Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.08 covers the issue of conflicts of interest as 
they relate to transactions made between attorneys and their clients.15  It is 
Rules 1.08(d) & (h) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct 
which specifically limit the modes of assistance attorneys may offer their 
clients.  Rule 1.08(d) states: 
(d) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection 
with pending or contemplated litigation or administrative proceedings, except 
that: (1) a lawyer may advance or guarantee court costs, expenses of litigation 
or administrative proceedings, and reasonably necessary medical and living 
expenses, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the 
matter; and (2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs 
and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.16   
Rule 1.08(h) states: 
(h) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or 
subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that 
the lawyer may: (1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer’s fee or 
 
13. Wythe II Corp. v. Stone, 342 S.W.3d 96, 103 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied). 
14. Id. 
15. See generally TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T 
CODE Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (discussing the various conflicts of interest issues that may arise in 
an attorney-client relationship). 
16. Id. at R. 1.08(d). 
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expenses; and (2) contract in a civil case with a client for a contingent fee that 
is permissible under Rule 1.04.17   
Case law surrounding the application of these provisions is sparse, and 
the Texas Supreme Court has yet to give much detailed analysis of the 
correct application of Rule 1.08(d).18  It is Rule 1.08(d) that would provide 
the crux of the guarantee of adverse attorney’s fees.  However, a fuller 
understanding of both the underlying historical considerations and how 
Rule 1.08 intersects with the other disciplinary rules is required before 
discussing the specifics of how this practice would work.   
C. Disciplinary Rule of Conduct 7.03 
Texas Disciplinary Rule 7.03(e) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not pay, 
give, or offer to pay or give anything of value to a person not licensed to 
practice law for soliciting or referring prospective clients for professional 
employment . . . .”19  The rule goes on to say in subsection (f) that “[a] 
lawyer shall not, for the purpose of securing employment, pay, give, 
advance, or offer to pay, give, or advance anything of value to a prospective 
client, other than actual litigation expenses and other financial assistance 
permitted by Rule 1.08([e]) . . . .”20  It must be emphatically stated that the 
suggested practice of guaranteeing an award of adverse attorney’s fees is not 
to be used as a lure by attorneys fishing for clients.   
D. Disciplinary Rule of Conduct 8.04(a)(9) 
Texas Disciplinary Rule 8.04(a)(9) states that a lawyer shall not “engage 
in conduct that constitutes barratry as defined by the law of this state[.]”21  
Barratry, as far as Rule 8.04 is concerned,22 is defined under Section 38.12 
 
17. Id. at R. 1.08(h). 
18. See Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 542, 2002 WL 405093 (2002) (stating without 
explanation or authorities, besides Rule 1.08(d), that “[a] fee arrangement with an insurance company 
under which the lawyer is required to pay the costs and expenses of litigation, regardless of the outcome 
of the litigation, would constitute a violation of Rule 1.08(d) . . . .”). 
19. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.03(e). 
20. Id. at R. 7.03(f). 
21. Id. at R. 8.04(a)(9). 
22. Like champerty and maintenance, barratry is a nearly ancient common law crime that 
involves “[v]exatious incitement to litigation, esp. by soliciting potential legal clients.”  Barratry, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see Neese v. Lyon, 479 S.W.3d 368, 382 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2015, no pet.) (allowing clients to bring suit “to avoid contingency-fee agreements procured by 
barratry and seek the remedy of rescission and restitution”); see generally Solicitation and Barratry, 
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, https://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/ForLawyers/Grievan 
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of the Texas Penal Code.23  Among other inapplicable violations, 
Section 38.12 provides that a person commits a barratry offense if he or she 
“pays, gives, or advances or offers to pay, give, or advance to a prospective 
client money or anything of value to obtain employment as a professional 
from the prospective client[.]”24  However, the only way in which an 
attorney could execute the practice proposed here would be under a 
contingent fee agreement which meets the requirements of Rule 1.04.  
Subsequently, any client who could receive the benefit of this practice would 
be a current—rather than a prospective—client.  This practice is not to be 
used as a means of soliciting clients.  Rather, it should be used as a means 
of protecting existing clients from the threat of adverse attorney’s fees, thus 
expanding access to justice, most especially for indigent clients.  
Furthermore, as there is a prosecutorial exception for conduct which is 
authorized by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,25 there 
is a necessity for the guaranteeing of adverse attorney’s fees to be explicitly 
approved by the Texas Supreme Court.26   
Barratry is still an all too common issue in Texas, and has even been 
litigated over while this Comment was being written.27  The Texas 
Legislature saw fit to enact Section 82.0651 of the Texas Government Code, 
entitled “Civil Liability for Prohibited Barratry.”28  Under Section 82.0651, 
a person who is found to be in violation of either the Penal Code29 or 
Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct30 can be assessed a $10,000 
penalty, actual damages springing from their conduct, and attorney’s fees.31   
 
ceandEthics/SolicitationandBarratry/default.htm [https://perma.cc/6KV5-PZJ2](summarizing the 
relevant provisions and prohibitions under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct). 
23. See generally TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12 (providing a series of violations which 
constitute barratry); Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 623, 76 Tex. B.J. 823 (2013) (discussing the 
prohibition of barratry and solicitation). 
24. PENAL § 38.12. 
25. Id. § 38.12(c); Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 623, 76 Tex. B.J. 823 (2013). 
26. See Medlock v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 24 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex. App—Texarkana 
2000, no pet.) (upholding a twelve-month suspension and a fine of $3,000 as attorney’s fees for 
committing a Rule 7.07(a) & 8.04(a)(9) violation via written solicitation). 
27. See generally Sullo v. Kubosh, 616 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) 
(litigating three consolidated barratry cases with at least seventy-four plaintiffs). 
28. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 82.0651; Sullo, 616 S.W.3d at 875. 
29. PENAL § 38.12. 
30. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.03, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., 
tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A. 
31. GOV’T § 82.0651(b). 
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III.    HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
A. Constitutional Values Invoked 
As previously mentioned, the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct are 
based on the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  However, in order to fully appreciate the historical significance of 
the concepts at hand, one must have a more in-depth idea of how the 
current ABA rules came about.  The current rules were first adopted by the 
American Bar Association House of Delegates in 198332 which replaced the 
1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility.33  The Model Rules have 
frequently been revisited.34 
Those who cast dispersions against the notion put forth by this Comment 
fail to realize that the underpinnings of this notion span much wider than 
any state codes or the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  The 
Constitution of the State of Texas has existed throughout history in six 
separate iterations.35  In every version there has contained an open courts 
provision consisting of identical words.36  The open courts provision reads, 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishment inflicted.  All courts shall be open, and every 
person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law.”37  While it is certain that the 
freedoms enshrined in the Texas Constitution significantly predate the 
adoption of even the Canons of Professional Ethics, one must look deeper into 
the tides of history to understand the true import of the open courts 
doctrine.   
 
32. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (showcasing the 
current rules issued by the ABA). 
33. Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969) (serving as ABA’s model 
rules before being replaced by the current Model Rules of Professional Conduct). 
34. The Model Code was in turn preceded by the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics.  MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT.; see also CANNON OF PROF’L ETHICS (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1908) (showing 
how the Model Code evolved into its current form). 
35. LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339 n.4 (Tex. 1986) (“Texas has had six constitutions: 
The Republic Constitution of 1836, the Statehood Constitution of 1845, the Confederate Constitution 
of 1861, the Union Constitution of 1866, the Reconstruction Constitution of 1869, and the present 
Post-Reconstruction Constitution of 1876.”); see GEORGE D. BRADEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 2 (1977) (highlighting the 
evolution of the bill of rights through the six versions of the Texas Constitution). 
36. LeCory, 713 S.W.2d at 339; BRADEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 2.  
37. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
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The open courts doctrine in the Texas Constitution is derived in large 
part from the Magna Carta.38  The provision, which protects a remedy for 
every person by due course of law, does not create any new rights by itself, 
but rather, it highlights a principle of law which predates the English 
common law.39  Despite being removed from the Magna Carta’s40 signing 
by over half a millennia, Texas has been outright in its adoption of the values 
inculcated within the Magna Carta.41  The open courts doctrine found in 
every version of the Texas Constitution is a derivation of the great liberties 
first guaranteed by the Magna Carta in 1215.42  The Texas Supreme Court 
has itself stated on separate occasions that “[a]ll grants of power are to be 
interpreted in the light of the maxims of Magna Charta and the Common 
Law as transmuted into the Bill of Rights[]”43 and “[t]he open courts 
provision’s history also reflects its significance . . . .  Colonists brought to 
America and then to Texas their belief in the historic rights guaranteed by 
Magna Carta.”44  
The impact of the Magna Carta on Texas law is incalculable.  It was 
directly relied upon when drafting the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of 
 
38. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 interp. commentary (West 2007).  
39. Id. 
40. For those rusty on their English history, the Magna Carta has been a cornerstone of western 
legal history for over eight centuries.  Its inception came out of a civil rebellion against King John I 
which took place in 1215.  What is Magna Carta?, BRITISH LIBRARY, https://www.bl.uk/magna-
carta/videos/what-is-magna-carta# [https://perma.cc/6BJU-J3FA] (discussing the history behind the 
Magna Carta as well as its importance in today’s legal traditions).  Fed up at the King’s immense taxes 
to fuel costly foreign wars, combined with his tyrannical disregard for the law, the barons of England 
took hold of London and captured the King.  Id.  This forced King John to sign into law certain rights 
and protections of the people.  Id.  The Magna Carta was the first major example of limiting the power 
of the sovereign in western history.  Id. 
41. Vincent Johnson, The Great Charter A Look at the History and Texas Legacy of the Magna Carta, 
Which Celebrates Its 800th Anniversary This Year, 78 TEX. B.J. 266, 266 (2015).  
42. See LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. 1986) (citing BRADEN ET AL., supra 
note 35, at 77) (providing a mechanism for the open courts doctrine to be used in modern day courts); 
see also Johnson, supra note 41, at 267 (quoting LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 339) (explaining the use of the 
open courts doctrine). 
43. Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 515 (Tex. 1921); see also Johnson, supra note 41, 
at 267 (quoting Spann, 235 S.W. at 515) (expressing the continuing use of the open courts doctrine).  
44. LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 339 (citing BRADEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 3; see Johnson, supra 
note 41, at 267 (quoting LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 339) (discussing the use of the open courts doctrine by 
the Texas Supreme Court). 
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Texas.45  Furthermore, it was similarly used as a foundation for the Texas 
Bill of Rights.46   
The open courts doctrine stems from chapter 40 of the Magna Carta, 
which reads in English “[t]o no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay 
right or justice.”47  While the concept of the open courts doctrine cannot 
be found in the United States Constitution, it has nonetheless “been a part 
of our constitutional law since our republic.”48  It can be said with much 
historical foundation that the open courts doctrine as well as the very 
concept of due process “are rooted in the Magna Carta and represent a ‘basic 
consensus in our society about how government should act.’”49   
B. The English System 
Having established the palpable impact of the Magna Carta on Texas law, 
it becomes necessary to point out a harmful concept in English law—known 
as the “English rule” of recovery.  Under the English system, the losing 
party must pay the attorney’s fees of the opposing side.50  While this 
“winner takes all” type of recovery method might seem the fairer way to go, 
it is indeed not.  Our learned founders saw the crippling effect the English 
system could have on losing parties, as well as the chilling effect it had on 
plaintiffs bringing suit.  In response to this, the “American rule” dictates 
that each party pays its own way with limited exceptions51 which were 
 
45. Johnson, supra note 41, at 267; Jadd F. Masso, Mind the Gap: Expansion of Texas Governmental 
Immunity Between Takings and Tort, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 265, 272 (2005).  
46. Johnson, supra note 41, at 267; Arvel (Rod) Ponton III, Sources of Liberty in the Texas Bill of 
Rights, 20 ST. MARY’S L.J. 93, 119 (1988). 
47. English Translation of Magna Carta, Brit. Libr., https://www.bl.uk/magna-
carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation [perma.cc/T7LJ-5TQ5] (furnishing a full-text 
translation of the Magna Carta) [hereinafter Magna Carta]. 
48. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex. 1988); see Johnson, supra note 41, at 267 
(affirming the continuity of the open courts doctrine into modern law). 
49. Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring) (quoting 
BRADEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 51). 
50. The power to award attorney’s fees and costs has existed for centuries in the English Court 
of Chancery.  See Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 28 F.2d 233, 240 (8th Cir. 1928) (citing 
Stallo v. Wagner, 245 F. 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1917)) (expressing the inequity in the English system). 
51. In particular circumstances, an admiralty plaintiff can receive attorney’s fees, though they 
are technically considered to be included in compensatory damages.  Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. 
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (citing Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962)).  
Attorney’s fees have been awarded in anti-discrimination suits as well.  Rolax v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 
186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951). 
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inherited from the common law52 and later expanded.  The traditional 
exceptions being: cases of gross misconduct and fraud which were not 
sustained; where the basis of the suit is “false, unjust, vexatious, wanton, or 
oppressive and so shown to be[;]”53 or for breach of fiduciary duty.54  The 
American rule stretches all the way back to the foundation of our republic.55  
As early as 1796, the Supreme Court of the United States held against an 
award of attorney’s fees and required the parties to pay their own fees, 
stating: “The general practice of the United States is in opposition to [the 
general award of attorney’s fees]; and even if that practice were not strictly 
correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, 
or modified, by statute.”56  Rather than reversing this approach, the 
Legislature chose instead to codify the American rule by act of Congress in 
1853.57   
 
52. Russel v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 437 (1881) (“But the Circuit Court of the United States . . . 
[is governed by] the rules of practice prescribed by this court and by the Circuit Court not inconsistent 
therewith; and, . . . by the practice of the High Court of Chancery in England prevailing when the 
equity rules were adopted . . . .  Equity Rule 90.”); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. 425, 430 (1868) (“The equity 
jurisdiction conferred on the Federal courts is the same that the High Court of Chancery in England 
possesses . . . .”); Fountain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. 369, 384 (1854) (“The courts of the United States cannot 
exercise any equity powers, except those conferred by acts of [C]ongress, and those judicial powers 
which the high court of chancery in England . . . possessed and exercised, at the time of the formation 
of the [C]onstitution of the United States.”); Guardian Trust Co., 28 F.2d at 240 (citation omitted) (“The 
United States courts of equity at the time of their creation became endowed with the powers, including 
that over costs, possessed by the English Chancery Court.”). 
53. Guardian Trust Co., 28 F.2d at 241. 
54. It should be noted that at least in Texas—unlike in other jurisdictions—attorney’s fees are 
generally unrecoverable for breaches of fiduciary duty.  See Messier v. Messier, 458 S.W.3d 155, 165 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing Hollister v. Maloney, Martin & Mitchell LLP, 
No. 14-12-00529-CV, 2013 WL 2149823 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] May 16, 2013, no pet.)) 
(expressing the oppressive nature of the “winner take all” mentality); see also W. Reserve Life Assur. 
Co. of Ohio v. Graben, 233 S.W.3d 360, 377 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (exploring the 
unjust nature of the English rule). 
55. Daniel H. Fehderau, Comment, Rule 11 and the Court’s Inherent Power to Shift Attorney’s Fees: 
An Analysis of Their Competing Objectives and Applications, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 701, 702–03 (1993). 
56. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796); see id. at 703 (highlighting the Supreme 
Court’s consistent reaffirmation of the American rule); Sande L. Buhai, Everyone Makes Mistakes: 
Attorney’s Fee Recovery in Legal Malpractice Suits, 6 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 32, 48 (2016) 
(describing the more than 200-year roots of the American rule). 
57. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 171, 10 Stat. 161 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923 
(1988)); Fehderau, supra note 55, at 703 (1993) (highlighting the change in previous rules to modern 
law); Buhai, supra note 56, at 48 (underscoring the change to modern law enacted by Congress).  
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The most important issue surrounding the English system for this 
Comment is the loss of access to the courts litigants face.58  The English 
legal system seems to loathe litigation and will punish anyone who dares 
bring an unsuccessful claim to court.59  Courts under the English rule value 
settlement and deterrence over litigation and access to the courts.60   
The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the American rule, opining in 
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.61 that “since litigation is at 
best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or 
prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from 
instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included 
the fees of their opponents’ counsel.”62  Furthermore, the Court noted that 
the labor, time, expense, and difficulty in properly determining what a 
“reasonable” attorney’s fees award should be in every case would create 
“substantial burdens for judicial administration.”63   
Though on the rise in America, awards of adverse attorney’s fees are an 
institutionally disfavored practice and are relatively uncommon.64  In order 
to overcome the general rule against adverse attorney’s fees there usually 
must be overriding considerations of justice which warrant such a 
practice.65  This said, Texas has followed the path of other states by 
legislatively expanding the loser pay system for certain statutory 
 
58. Allison F. Aranson, The United States Percentage Contingent Fee System: Ridicule and Reform From 
an International Perspective, 27 TEX. INT’L L.J. 755, 774 (1992) (“[T]he structure of the British system did 
deny parties access to justice whether or not they had meritorious claims.”); Michael Napier, 
Counterpoint: For Many, English Rule Impedes Access to Justice, WALL ST. J., Sep. 24, 1992, at A17 
(“Essentially the English Rule requires the loser in a lawsuit to pay the winner’s attorney fees and court 
costs . . . .  The plaintiff who cannot risk paying everyone’s legal costs effectively forfeits his or her 
access to justice.  Thus the litigation disincentive sometimes caused by the English Rule has more to 
do with the client’s fear of costs than worry about the merits of the claim.”); Edward F. Sherman, From 
“Loser Pays” to Modified Offer of Judgement Rules: Reconciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 1863, 1863 (1998) (“Perhaps the strongest historical justification for the American rule is centered 
in the American faith in liberal access to the courts for righting wrongs.”). 
59. See Aranson, supra note 58, at 774 (“British courts employ clear categorical rules and adhere 
rigidly to stare decisis, aiding out of court settlements and guarding against change and experimentation 
in the courtroom.”). 
60. Id. 
61. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). 
62. Id. at 718 (citing Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964)). 
63. Id. (citing Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. 211, 231 (1872)). 
64. See David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the 
“American Rule” and “English Rule,” 15 IND. INT'L & COMPAR. L. REV. 583, 584–85 (2005) (discussing 
the history of the “American rule” for adverse attorney fees). 
65. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 386 U.S. at 718. 
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violations.66  While it is true that under the American system plaintiffs are 
not truly made whole with awards of consequential damages, this is not an 
issue which has bearing on this discussion.67  
There are those who feel that the British system is a more equitable and 
expedient system.  Those who propose this notion fail to consider the 
coercion that goes on in the British system towards indigent plaintiffs with 
otherwise meritorious claims.  The same motivation felt by opposing parties 
of similar or at least moderate wealth are disproportionately impactful on 
indigent clients.  Proponents of the “loser pays” mentality claim that the 
English system discourages parties from dragging out litigation in order to 
induce settlement.68  The bottom line is that the English rule is manifestly 
unfair.  It brings with it an undue hardship on those who lose their case.  
For plaintiffs who cannot prove their cause it creates liability when there has 
been no wrongdoing, and for defendants it adds insult to injury.  Despite all 
its reforms, the English legal system is still based on the notion that all claims 
which fail to win are inherently unmeritorious.   
Adverse attorney’s fees are just as damaging to those they are imposed 
upon regardless of whether they stem from some state or federal statutory 
provision, or due to a specific contract clause.  The important thing to take 
away from the English rule is it has a deleterious effect on its target, as well 
as a prospective one to the courts through intimidation of plaintiffs.  
Conveniently, for anyone making such a claim it is difficult to determine the 
metrics of how many plaintiffs fail to bring otherwise legitimate lawsuits 
simply because they are indigent and petrified of financial ruin.   
Allowing for the practice of guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fee awards 
would insulate plaintiffs and defendants from the harsh nature of the 
English rule.69  Attorneys would simply analyze the facts surrounding each 
individual case and make a determination of the likely outcome.  While there 
are those that might say allowing for this practice might well lead to 
attorneys pushing harder on their clients to settle early, this is non-sequitur 
 
66. Gregory E. Maggs & Michael D. Weiss, Progress on Attorney’s Fees: Expanding the “Loser Pays” 
Rule in Texas, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1915, 1937 (1994); Buhai, supra note 56, at 51–67 (detailing the main 
categories in which adverse attorney’s fees awards are upheld). 
67. Michael C. Moore, Legal Malpractice and the Bad Faith Exception to the American Rule: A Suggested 
Approach for Addressing Intentional Lawyer Misconduct, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141, 1152 (1991). 
68. Aranson, supra note 58, at 779. 
69. See Napier, supra note 58, at A17 (“It is hard to imagine how in the [United States] any 
individual or business, short of a corporate giant, can afford to risk the result of an English rule award 
of costs.  In England, the system has survived primarily because of a government-funded Legal Aid 
scheme, which cushions the effect the rule has on many losing plaintiffs.”). 
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of sorts.  In a normal situation where defendants are faced with the threat 
of adverse attorney’s fees, there are only two good options: (1) prevail on 
the merits and avoid an adverse award; or (2) settle early so opposing 
counsel’s fees are lower.  In the end it comes down to allocating the risk on 
the attorneys rather than the clients.  Indigent clients are already more 
vulnerable and less likely to take a case to trial as it is, so adopting this safety 
net would be a meaningful way to open-up access to the courts of justice.  
The judiciary has an interest in making sure that all parties in a possible 
lawsuit have access to the courts.  Allowing for the guarantee of adverse 
attorney’s fees expands access to the courts in exchange for a nominal 
expansion of contingency fee agreements.  Such an expansion is unlikely to 
lead to disciplinary violations that are not already provided for in the current 
ethical regulations.  
IV.    MECHANISMS THAT DISCOURAGE ABUSE OF 
CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENTS 
A. Fee Forfeiture 
There are a number of remedial measures that have been put in place to 
ensure attorneys do not abuse their discretion in accepting contingent fee 
clients.  The strongest of these remedies is arguably fee forfeiture,70 which 
has been put in place “to protect relationships of trust by discouraging 
agents’ disloyalty.”71  However, only serious and clear violations of duty will 
be actionable.72  Courts consider “the gravity and timing of the violation, 
its willfulness, its effect on the value of the lawyer’s work for the client, any 
other threatened or actual harm to the client, and the adequacy of other 
remedies” when determining seriousness.73  Clear violations are those 
 
70. See Webb v. Crawley, 590 S.W.3d 570, 587 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2019, no pet.) (citing 
Burrow v. Acre, 997 S.W.2d 229, 237, 246 (Tex. 1999)) (outlining when a court may order forfeiture 
of a fee); Izen v. Laine, 614 S.W.3d 775, 791(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (citing 
First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 221–22 (Tex. 2017)) 
(highlighting when fee forfeiture may be awarded as an equitable remedy). 
71. Wythe II Corp. v. Stone, 342 S.W.3d 96, 104 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied) 
(quoting Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 238). 
72. Id. (citing Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 241); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (AM. L. INST. 2021) (“[A] lawyer is civilly liable to a client if the lawyer 
breaches a fiduciary duty to the client set forth in § 16(3) and if that failure is a legal cause of injury 
within the meaning of § 53, unless the lawyer has a defense within the meaning of § 54.”). 
73. Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 243; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 49. 
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where a “reasonable lawyer, knowing the relevant facts and law reasonably 
accessible to the lawyer, would have known that the conduct was 
wrongful.”74  
The trial court decides whether forfeiture is appropriate.75  The court’s 
primary consideration in deciding this is “whether forfeiture is necessary to 
satisfy the public’s interest in protecting the attorney-client relationship.”76  
The Restatement gives the court wide discretion in crafting a forfeiture 
remedy.77  Even though the immediate goal of this remedy is to safeguard 
the public’s confidence in attorney-client relationships, forfeiture is still 
capable of providing direct compensation to clients.78  It should be noted 
that Texas has approved section 49 of the Restatement, along with most 
other jurisdictions who have considered like issues.79 
B. Frivolous Claims 
Professor Schneyer opined in his article, Legal-Process Constraints on the 
Regulation of Lawyers’ Contingent Fee Contracts, that contingent fee agreements 
breed incentive for bringing frivolous lawsuits.80  However, the learned 
professor himself discredits this notion by acknowledging the universal 
reality that attorneys utilizing contingent fees “will generally have stronger 
incentives than hourly-rate lawyers to reject weak cases.”81  It is not within 
the economic interest of a contingent-fee attorney to take frivolous claims, 
as they are inherently unlikely to prevail.82  Furthermore, besides the risk of 
 
74. Wythe II Corp., 342 S.W.3d at 104 (quoting Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 241 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49, cmt. d (AM. L. INST., Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 1996))). 
75. Id. at 105 (citing Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 246); see also Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 
282 S.W.3d 419, 428–29 (Tex. 2008) (detailing the appropriate measure of forfeiture). 
76. Wythe II Corp., 342 S.W.3d at 105 (quoting Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 246). 
77. See Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 241–42 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 cmt. b. (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)) (“The remedy 
of this Section should hence be applied with discretion.”). 
78. Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 243–44.  
79. Id. at 242 (detailing with great depth the various jurisdictions that have adopted the 
restatement approach). 
80. Schneyer, supra note 12, at 388–89. 
81. Id. at 389–90 (reproducing empirical data which shows contingent lawyers substantially filter 
unmeritorious claims out of the court system). 
82. See Michael P. Stone & Thomas J. Miceli, The Impact of Frivolous Lawsuits on Deterrence: Do They 
Have Some Redeeming Value?, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 301, 305 (2014) (explaining the Supreme Court’s 
view on what a frivolous claim may be described as); see also Frivolous, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2019) (defining “frivolous” as “[l]acking a legal basis or legal merit”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 110 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2021) (“A frivolous position is one that 
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gaining nothing upon defeat in a contingency case, lawyers who bring 
frivolous claims are subject to both tort damages83 and sanctions.84 
In order for a plaintiff to prevail in a claim of malicious prosecution in a 
civil case, the plaintiff has the burden to prove and establish: “(1) the 
institution or continuation of civil proceedings against the plaintiff; (2) by 
or at the insistence of the defendant; (3) malice in the commencement of 
the proceeding; (4) lack of probable cause for the proceeding; 
(5) termination of the proceeding in plaintiff’s favor; and (6) special 
damages.”85  The last of the elements listed—special damages—has also 
been referred to as “special injury.”86  The designation of “special damages” 
is meant to differentiate them from “the ordinary losses incident to 
defending a civil suit, such as inconvenience, embarrassment, discovery 
costs, and attorney’s fees.”87   
Texas has provided, in Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 
that: 
Attorneys or parties who shall bring a fictitious suit as an experiment to get 
an opinion of the court, or who shall file any fictitious pleading in a cause for 
such a purpose, or shall make statements in pleading which they know to be 
groundless and false, for the purpose of securing a delay of the trial of the 
cause, shall be held guilty of a contempt.  If a pleading, motion or other paper 
is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, after notice and hearing, shall impose an appropriate sanction 
 
a lawyer of ordinary competence would recognize as so lacking in merit that there is no substantial 
possibility that the tribunal would accept it.”). 
83. Airgas-Sw., Inc. v. IWS Gas & Supply of Tex., Ltd., 390 S.W.3d 472, 478 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex. 
1996) (recognizing the tort of malicious prosecution in Texas). 
84. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 (concerning sanctions for frivolous lawsuits); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE § 10.002 (providing for motions for sanctions to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs 
associated with frivolous litigation); Id. § 27.009(b) (“If the court finds that a motion to dismiss filed 
under this chapter is frivolous or solely intended to delay, the court may award costs and reasonable 
attorney’s fees to the responding party.”).  It should be noted that statutes such as this would directly 
contradict the practice being suggested in this Comment.  Should an attorney wish to guarantee the 
threat of adverse attorney’s fees it would be illogical for them to violate a statute which clearly provides 
for the awarding of adverse attorney’s fees when violated. 
85. Airgas-Sw., Inc., 390 S.W.3d at 478 (quoting Tex. Beef Cattle Co., 921 S.W.2d at 207); see also 
Kroger Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 792 n.3 (Tex. 2006) (listing congruent requirements 
to that of Airgas to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim). 
86. Id. (citing Ross v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 892 S.W.2d 119, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1994, no writ)). 
87. Id. (citing Tex. Beef Cattle Co., 921 S.W.2d at 208). 
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available under Rule 215-2b, upon the person who signed it, a represented 
party, or both.88 
Indeed, it is a flimsy shield both counsel and client hide behind if they think 
the simple nature of a contingency fee agreement will insulate them from 
the swift rebuke of the court should they bring forth a frivolous lawsuit.89  
Texas courts have been known in the past to inflict harsh penalties on those 
who bring frivolous claims.90   
C. Strong-Arming Clients and Rule 1.02 Violations 
Apart from fee forfeiture, clients are also protected under both the Model 
Rules91 and the Texas rules.92  Rule 1.02 of the Texas rules concerns the 
scope and objectives of representation.  Subsection (a) of 1.02 states:  
(a) Subject to paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e), (f), and (g), a lawyer shall abide 
by a client’s decisions: (1) concerning the objectives and general methods of 
representation; (2) whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter, except 
as otherwise authorized by law; (3) In a criminal case, after consultation with 
the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether 
the client will testify.93 
Subject to this, attorneys risk disciplinary hearings against them if they 
subvert the client’s control over the substantive matters of a case.94  There 
are those who might feel the guarantee of paying an adverse attorney’s fee 
award creates too high of a risk that attorneys will strong-arm their clients 
into settlement to avoid paying out higher fees.  However, these fears are 
largely faulty.  It is clear and unequivocal in Texas that clients make the 
 
88. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. 
89. Cf. Schneyer, supra note 12, at 389 (“The argument that contingent fees encourage frivolous 
claims by freeing clients of all fee obligations when a case fails begins to seem frivolous itself when one 
considers the incentives the fees create for lawyers.”). 
90. See, e.g., Bradt v. Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 769 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. 
denied) (affirming a $100,000 sanction for bringing a frivolous claim). 
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (“[A] lawyer shall 
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, 
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. . . .  A lawyer shall abide 
by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”). 
92. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.02(a), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A. 
93. Id. 
94. See id. (outlining violations that would result in sanctions for an attorney). 
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substantive decisions in their cases.  Courts have repeatedly invalidated 
contingency fee agreements which force the client to procure his or her 
attorney’s approval before accepting a settlement offer, as these are against 
public policy.95  Any attorney who strongarms a client into a settlement will 
risk landing in hot water with the state bar’s disciplinary board.96 
V.    FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Interest in the Cause of Litigation 
There are those97 who believe for an attorney to guarantee the possibility 
of adverse attorney’s fees awards makes them “acquire a proprietary interest 
in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation . . . .”98  While it is 
curious that Oklahoma’s Rule 1.8(e) significantly mirrors Texas’99, its 
reasoning behind the rule is flawed.  In the Oklahoma Bar Association Legal 
Ethics Committee’s Ethics Opinion 323, the Oklahoma Bar Association 
makes a critical error in judgement by ruling that indemnifying clients 
against the threat of adverse attorney’s fees awards gives an attorney an 
unethical proprietary interest in the cause of action.100 
The committee took too narrow a view of the practice of adverse 
attorney’s fee indemnification.  Should an attorney choose to make a 
contractual agreement with a rationally informed client where the parties 
agree the attorney shall indemnify the client of any adverse attorney’s fees, 
 
95. In re Plaza, 363 B.R. 517, 521–22 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (quoting Lewis v. S.S. Baume, 
534 F.2d 1115, 1122 (5th Cir. 1976)); Davis Law Firm v. Bates, No. 13-13-00209-CV, 
2014 WL 585855, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 13, 2014, no pet.). 
96. See 25 Texas Lawyers Gone Rogue, the December 2019 List of Judges and Texas Lawyer Sanctions & 
The 20 Bad Attorneys Who are Privately Disciplined, LAWS IN TEXAS (Dec. 12, 2019), 
https://lawsintexas.com/25-texas-lawyers-gone-rogue-the-december-2019-list-of-judges-texas-lawyer 
-sanctions/ [https://perma.cc/32C2-42X5] (detailing the various sanctions, suspensions, and 
reprimands given by the Texas Bar Disciplinary Actions committee in 2019, three of which are for 
violations of Rule 1.02). 
97. The great state of Oklahoma is who I refer to here.  See generally Okla. Comm. on Legal 
Ethics, Op. 323, 2009 WL 806564 (2009) (explaining the Oklahoma Bar Association’s approach to 
adverse attorney’s fee indemnification). 
98. OKLA. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j); see Okla. Comm. On Legal Ethics, Op. 323, 
2009 WL 806564 (arguing “[n]o exception is made for an indemnification agreement[]” to the general 
prohibitions of Rule 1.8(j)). 
99. Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(h) with OKLA. RULES 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (highlighting the similarities between the Texas and Oklahoma Rules of 
Professional Conduct). 
100. Okla. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 323, 2009 WL 806564 (2009). 
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such an agreement ought to be upheld on both the principles of public 
policy towards securing representation and the freedom to contract.  The 
committee chose instead to bandy words, focusing on semantics rather than 
form.  It felt that the term “indemnify” was inapplicable to a contingency 
fee agreement, as there can be, in their opinion, “no expectation of 
repayment under any circumstances.”101  This is an unpersuasive argument 
when one applies common sense rationality to it.  An attorney who 
guarantees the threat of adverse attorney’s fees is not advancing anything at 
the time the contract is signed.  They are simply adding to the contingency 
already being created in the agreement.   
The Oklahoma Committee failed to adequately show that attorneys who 
choose to indemnify their clients of the threat of adverse attorney’s fees are 
therefore more likely to either exert an undue influence or otherwise subvert 
the legal system in order to avoid their contractual obligations.  Instead, they 
chose to focus on form over substance.  However, it should be mentioned 
that the committee raised an interesting point: the common law offenses of 
champerty and maintenance.102 
The offense of champerty and maintenance is nearly as old as the common 
law itself, and traces its heritage all the way back to the time of Edward I.103  
It is defined as a “bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by 
which the stranger pursues the party’s claim in consideration of receiving 
part of any judgment proceeds.”104  While the roots of this offense stretch 
all the way back to the heralded constitution of Roman Emperor Anastasius 
in 506 A.D., it has fallen largely by the wayside in light of more modern 
causes of action.105   
Even as far back as 1905 it was recognized that the common law interests 
behind these offenses had given way to the more appropriate consideration 
of contract legality.106  Historically, these offenses were envisioned to 
protect against great lords intimidating the courts through the meddling 




103. Modern Views of Champerty and Maintenance, 18 HARV. L. REV. 222, 222 (1905). 
104. Ari Dobner, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1543 (1996) (footnote omitted) 
(analyzing with great detail the history of champerty and maintenance). 
105. Id. at 1545 (quoting an excerpt from the constitution of Anastasius historian Max Radin 
found in Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48, 55 (1935)).  
106. Modern Views of Champerty and Maintenance, supra note 103, at 223. 
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them.107  Luckily enough, today, our modern requirements of standing are 
quite sufficient to keep those who have no business in a case from involving 
themselves.   
The comment, Modern Views of Champerty and Maintenance, while no longer 
indicative of modern views, is still important for the purposes of this 
discussion.108  While not only acting as a looking glass into the infancy of 
contingency fee agreements, the comment raised the legitimate notion that 
in the American court system there are few—if any—legitimately overriding 
public policy interests involving champerty and maintenance that ought to 
trump an otherwise valid and enforceable contract.109  While it is not the 
position of this Comment that the remaining laws against champerty-esque 
violations of public policy be overturned, it is firmly its contention that this 
ancient common law notion ought not interfere with contracts which 
further public policy.  When one thinks of the reasons why champerty and 
maintenance ought not to be allowed to interfere here, the oft quoted jurist 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. comes to mind:  
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid 
down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if the grounds upon 
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists 
from blind imitation of the past.110 
Once again, the Oklahoma Committee failed to recognize the reality of 
the situation.  There is a well-developed corpus of legal reasoning which 
shows the common law offenses of champerty and maintenance are largely 
defunct and have been replaced.111  The overwhelming force of legal 
research and jurisprudence shows it is the validity of the contract itself which 
should take precedence when determining the overall validity of the 
agreement.  The committee merely points to the possibility of abuse by 




108. See generally id. (discussing and analyzing twentieth century views on champerty and 
maintenance). 
109. Id. 
110. Oliver W. Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
111. See 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 24 (2020) (explaining the reasoning behind 
replacing champerty and maintenance from modern law); see also 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:1 
(4th ed. 2021) (providing the case illustration of Papageorge v. Banks, 81 A.3d 311 (D.C. 2013) for 
champerty). 
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The Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee, on the other hand, has a 
more correct stance on the issue of contingently agreeing to guarantee 
adverse attorney’s fees.112  The Alaska Committee was given the question 
of “whether a plaintiff’s attorney, who has a defense verdict returned in a 
contingency fee case, is ethically permitted to agree to pay the attorney fee 
award against his or her client, should an appeal of the verdict be 
unsuccessful.”113  The committee based its decision on interpretation of 
Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct 1.8(e) and (j).114 
The committee went on to comment that 1.8(j) is the “traditional rule” 
used to prohibit an attorney from acquiring a proprietary interest in the 
cause of litigation, and that the comments note it is based on the common 
law rules concerning champerty and maintenance.115  The committee took 
a real-world approach to the issue, and concluded that there was “no 
practical or rational basis for excluding an attorney fee award from the 
definition of ‘expenses of litigation.’”116  I share the opinion of the Alaska 
Committee that agreements, such as the one posited, are either actually or 
practically indistinguishable from other bona fide contingency 
agreements.117 
The Oklahoma Committee critiqued Alaska’s interpretation of their own 
rules for not assigning what Oklahoma believes to be the proper distinction 
between “advances” and “payments.”118  The Oklahoma Committee dug 
its heels in around the notion that an advance must carry with it the 
expectation of repayment.119  The committee failed to give equal weight to 
the entire rule, which goes on to say at the very end “the repayment of which 
may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.”120  It is odd that the 
committee would take such a narrow view of Rule 1.8(e), choosing to place 
an unbalanced importance on the Meriam Webster denotation of “advance” 
rather than assigning the clear and plain meaning of the four corners of the 
rule itself in equal measure.  
 
112. Alaska Comm. on Ethics, Op. 2004-2, 2004 WL 1853007, at *1 (2004). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at *2 
116. Id. 
117. Id. (“The Committee is also of the opinion that an attorney’s agreement to pay an attorney 
fee award, is a natural extension of, or at least not sufficiently distinguishable from, a traditional and 
permissible contingency fee agreement.”). 
118. Okla. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 323, 2009 WL 806564 (2009) at *2. 
119. Id. 
120. OKLA. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e). 
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Read as a whole, the rules of Texas, Alaska, and Oklahoma clearly support 
the notion that the so-called expectation of repayment which the Oklahoma 
Committee placed such importance on can be nested within, and thereby 
subsumed by the contingency that the client will be successful.121  The 
Oklahoma Committee took too narrow a view of the history behind both 
their rule and the ABA Model Rules.122  Alaska on the other hand 
accounted for the complex and important considerations of whether this 
would constitute an impermissible loan by the attorney, the possible 
negative impact on client’s pre-filing merits, the implications of Alaska Rule 
of Civil Procedure 82 (which promotes avoiding protracted litigation and 
seeks settlement), the risks of frivolous litigation, the threat of compromised 
attorney loyalty, or overreaching due to counsel’s economic self-interest.123  
These considerations yield a more logically persuasive argument than that 
given by the Oklahoma Committee. 
B. Colorado’s Approach 
The Supreme Court of Colorado sat en banc when it faced a similar 
attorney’s fee issue during a particularly litigious dispute in Mercantile 
Adjustment Bureau, L.L.C. v. Flood. 124  This case involved a trial attorney who 
paid an up-front fee to his client’s appellate attorneys, repayment of which 
was contingent on a favorable appeal.125  When the appeals court awarded 
attorney’s fees opposing counsel appealed once again, claiming that the 
award was impermissible under the Colorado Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.8(e).  They claimed that the payment of appellate attorney’s fees 
by the trial attorney “violated the ethics rules against providing financial 
assistance to clients . . . .”126  
 
121. Alaska Comm. on Ethics, Op. 2004-2, 2004 WL 1853007, at *1 (2004); Okla. Comm. on 
Legal Ethics, Op. 323, 2009 WL 806564 (2009) at *2. 
122. Okla. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 323, 2009 WL 806564 (2009), at *3 (“Rule 1.8(e) was 
amended in 1993.  The 1993 language (set forth in Part I. above) tracks amendments to ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, and is the current rule.”). 
123. Alaska Comm. on Ethics, Op. 2004-2, 2004 WL 1853007, at *2 (2004). 
124. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, L.L.C. v. Flood, 278 P.3d 348 (Colo. 2012) (en banc). 
125. Id. at 350.  
126. Id. at 354. 
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Rule 1.8(e) of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct is very similar 
in both language and intent to its Texas counterpart, differing only in that 
the Texas rule includes the term “guarantee” in 1.08(d)(1).127   
The Colorado Supreme Court then made the important note that the 
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct seek to further the equal access of 
justice towards all litigants.128  The preamble to the Colorado rules even 
states that lawyers should “be mindful of deficiencies in the administration 
of justice” and should take into consideration that the poor and middle class 
alike sometimes cannot afford adequate counsel.129  The preamble goes on, 
in section 6, to say that lawyers should devote themselves to “ensure equal 
access” to our justice system for those who are socially and economically 
barred from the courts.130 
The Colorado Supreme Court then went on to splice together the 
interplay between the use of contingency fees and the advancement of court 
costs and the expenses of litigation.131  The court chose to take the opposite 
view to Oklahoma, concluding that the rule “is ultimately defined by its 
exception distinguishing between permissible and impermissible types of 
financial assistance to clients, rather than its preliminary unequivocal 
prohibition against providing financial assistance to clients.”132  The court 
next took the approach of the Oklahoma Committee and parsed out the 
language of the exception to resolve the distinctions “between permissible 
and impermissible expenses.”133 
Instead of focusing on the semantics behind the word “advance,” the 
court took a plain meaning approach to the terms “expense” and 
“litigation.”  The court defined expense as “[a]n expenditure of money, time, 
 
127. Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN., TIT. 2, SUBTIT. G, APP. A, with COLO. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (highlighting 
the subtle difference between the Texas and Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct). 
128. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, L.L.C, 278 P.3d at 355.  Compare COLO. CONST. art. II, § 6 
(“Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to 
person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or 
delay.”), with TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done 
him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.”). 
129. COLO. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT PMBL. § 6. 
130. Id. 
131. See Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, L.L.C., 278 P.3d at 355 (discussing the similar reasons the 
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct permit contingency fee arrangements and advancements of 
court costs and litigation expenses).  
132. Id. at 356. 
133. Id. 
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labor, or resources to accomplish a result.”134  Litigation was denoted as 
“[t]he process of carrying on a lawsuit.”135  Construing these terms in 
context, the court found that an expense of litigation constitutes “an 
expenditure of money, time, labor, or resources to accomplish the process 
of carrying on a lawsuit.”136 
Weighing the considerations in balance, the court determined that 
“[c]ontingent fees and advancement of litigation expenses are permitted as 
exceptions to the rule prohibiting financial assistance to clients because, 
despite their potential to create conflicts of interest, they ensure access to 
the courts.”137  It was ultimately decided that the purpose of the 
expenditure was the controlling factor, not the means of repayment.138  The 
court found that as long as an expense is rationally related to conducting 
litigation, it will fit within the exception.139  However, unlike the Texas 
approach, loans for living expenses and other such things are still 
impermissible in Colorado regardless of contingent repayment.140  Relying 
on many different sources the court upheld the award in its 5–2 decision.141   
The approach of the Colorado Supreme Court is a more learned and bona 
fide analysis.  The court not only took a plain meaning approach to the rule, 
but also considered the overall public policies involved in contingent fee 
agreements.142  Taking the open courts doctrine to heart, the court decided 
that the goal of open access to justice would be hampered by the curtailment 
of attorney’s fees guarantees.143  The court deftly deemed that disallowing 
the award of otherwise reasonable attorney’s fees upon successful appeal 
would lead to critical limitations on a plaintiff’s ability to seek redress.144  
 
134. Id. (quoting Expense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2019)).  
135. Id. (quoting Litigation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1017 (9th ed. 2019)). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. (citing Rubio v. BNSF Ry. Co., 548 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1224 (D.N.M 2008), and People 
v. Nutt, 696 P.2d 242, 248 n.3 (Colo. 1984)); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 36 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2000) (citation omitted) (“Allowing lawyers to advance [litigation] 
expenses is indistinguishable in substance from allowing contingent fees and has similar 
justifications . . . notably enabling poor clients to assert their rights.”). 
138. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, L.L.C., 278 P.3d.  
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 356–57 (citing Alaska Comm. on Ethics, Op. 2004-2, 2004 WL 1853007, at *1 
(2004)). 
142. See id. at 355–56 (explaining the court’s consideration of both the intent behind the rule 
and the plain language). 
143. Id. at 357. 
144. Id. 
  
210 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 12:186 
Defendants with deep pockets would be able to prevail simply through 
pursuing an appeal and bleeding plaintiffs dry.145  
And while Mercantile Adjustment Bureau was decided by a Colorado court 
with specific facts, the public policies and concerns underlying the decision 
are universal to all jurisdictions.  It is poor and indigent clients who would 
reap the benefits of a policy such as the one proposed.  
C. Settlement Offers & Texas’ Fee-Shifting Statutes 
There is an abundance of Texas statutes which allow parties to recover 
attorney’s fees.  These statutes range across the entire spectrum of civil 
practice, and include: shareholder derivative actions,146 declaratory 
judgements,147 DTPA claims,148 breach of contract claims,149 the Texas 
Property Code,150 the Texas Family Code,151 and various other 
applications.152  These statutes all provide for awards of attorney’s fees in 
a one-way scenario—either a party wins the case and prevails with the award 
or does not.  There is, however, a certain provision of the Texas Civil 
Practice and Remedies Code153 that creates unique problems for this 
discussion.   
Unlike the previously mentioned provisions, Chapter 42 of the Civil 
Practice and Remedies Code allows for a two-way attorney’s fee award 
 
145. Id. (citing Martin v. Allen, 566 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Colo. 1977) (en banc)). 
146. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.561. 
147. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009; see Heritage Res., Inc. v. Hill, 104 S.W.3d 
612, 617 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.) (discussing the application of Section 37.009 allowing for 
attorney’s fees to be awarded). 
148. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (concerning recoverability of attorney’s fees 
under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act). 
149. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 38.001 (concerning recoverability of attorney’s fees for breach of 
written or oral contracts); see generally Intercontinental Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 
295 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Tex. 2009) (allowing for the recovery practice in principle but making a 
distinction based on whether the plaintiff can qualify as a “prevailing party”). 
150. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.006 (concerning recoverability of attorney’s fees for breach 
restrictive covenants). 
151. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.708(c) (concerning recoverability of attorney’s fees in divorce 
suits); Id. § 106.002 (concerning recoverability of attorney’s fees in suits affecting parent-child 
relationships). 
152. See 48 Robert P. Schuwerk & Lillian B. Hardwick, Texas Practice Series § 1:17 (2020) 
(concerning recoverability of attorney’s fees for the prevailing party in various types of lawsuits). 
153. See generally CIV. PRAC. & REM. ch. 42 (regarding the effect of settlements on claims for 
monetary relief). 
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scenario.154  Under Section 42.004 of the Civil Practice and Remedies 
Code, if a defendant makes a settlement offer in a case which the statute 
applies,155 the plaintiff is then faced with the threat of adverse attorney’s 
fees should he or she deny the offer.156  Though the goal of the statute is 
to encourage litigants to accept otherwise “reasonable” settlement offers, 
the risks imposed on the parties favors wealthy litigants.  This practice is 
further codified under Rule 167 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.157   
Rule 167 and Chapter 42 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code apply 
to all civil monetary claims filed on or after January 1, 2004,158 but do not 
apply to shareholder’s derivative actions, class actions, family cases, actions 
against the government, workers’ compensation actions, and justice of the 
peace actions.159  Additionally, Rule 167 does not apply to settlement offers 
made in arbitration or mediation.160  Rule 167 sprung out of Chapter 42 of 
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code during the legislative wave of 
Texas tort reform in 2003.161  State legislators decided that Texas was 
bloated by “a general environment of excessive litigation.”162  Their 
solution was to pass Rule 167, which was part of House Bill 4.  Through 
Rule 167 state legislators hoped that parties would be incentivized to either 
streamline litigation or seek settlement.163  These incentives were brought 
about through the use of fee-shifting mechanisms found within 
Chapter 42.164   
Contingent fee agreements, such as the one proposed, are most likely to 
occur in tort cases as most contract cases are hourly fee agreements.  
Furthermore, cases where Chapter 42 of the code apply are more likely to 
 
154. Two-way fee awards, in the simplest terms, means that even if the plaintiff prevails on the 
merits of the case, he or she can still end up liable for adverse attorney’s fees.  Most one-way provisions 
only offer the prospect of attorney’s fees to plaintiffs. 
155. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 42.002 (stating the actions to which Chapter 42 does and does 
not apply). 
156. Id. § 42.004. 
157. TEX. R. CIV. P. 167.  
158. CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 42.002(a), .005. 
159. Id. § 42.002(b); Elaine A. Carlson, The New Texas Offer of Settlement Practice—the Newest Steps 
in the Tort Reform Dance, 44 THE ADVOC. 105 (2008). 
160. TEX. R. CIV. P. 167.7. 
161. Bobo v. Varughese, 507 S.W.3d 817, 826 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.). 
162. House Comm. on Civ. Practices, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2005). 
163. Michael S. Hull et al., Part Two: Detailed Analysis of the Civil Justice Reforms, 36 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 51, 66 (2005). 
164. Bobo, 507 S.W.3d at 826. 
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be tort cases than other types of cases.165  It is therefore reasonable to 
proceed on the notion that Chapter 42 settlements will often apply to many 
cases where contingent fee agreements are in use.   
Under Chapter 42, if a plaintiff’s final award is less favorable to them by 
a margin of 20% or more after rejecting a settlement offer, the plaintiff must 
be responsible for adverse litigation costs and attorney’s fees despite 
winning at trial.166  This raises completely different types of concerns than 
those normally involved in regular contingency scenarios.  Unlike the 
traditional model, plaintiffs facing a settlement offer covered by Chapter 42 
must take on the additional risk of getting a lower-than-expected award 
which triggers the statutory penalty.167  A simple scenario detailing this 
dilemma is: a plaintiff who seeks one million dollars in monetary damages 
will be forced to pay their opponent’s reasonable attorney’s fees if they reject 
any settlement offer above $800k.168  While it is not the focus of this 
Comment to argue whether $200k is an “unreasonable” margin to reject, it 
must be acknowledged that for many plaintiffs their decision to refuse offers 
of settlement come with extensive risk even without statutorily imposed 
punishments for rejection.   
The greater the damages sought the more significant the divide becomes 
between what the defendant can low-ball offer to still recoup litigation 
costs.169  Deep-pocketed defendants can afford to roll the dice and offer 
plaintiff’s low figures in hopes that the threat of adverse attorney’s fees and 
litigation costs will be enough to scare their opponents into settling.170  
 
165. Fee-shifting under Chapter 42 of the Code is available only when other statutes do not 
provide for it.  Fee-shifting in contract cases is covered under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 38.001.  
166. Carlson, supra note 159, at 107; CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 42.004(a).  
167. See 6 TEXAS TORTS AND REMEDIES § 103.02A (2021) (explaining the details of when 
“a party can be held liable for the other party’s litigation costs after the date the offer is made if that 
party rejects a reasonable settlement offer . . . .”); 7 DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 102.55 
(2021) (discussing how to obtain attorney’s fees if settlement negotiations fail). 
168. See 6 TEXAS TORTS AND REMEDIES § 103.02A (2021) (providing an example of when the 
plaintiff’s “ultimate recovery is less than 80[%] of the rejected offer, or for a defendant if the ultimate 
recovery is more than 120[%] of the rejected offer”); CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 42.004(a) (defining what 
constitutes a significantly less favorable judgement); 7 DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE 
§ 102.55 (2021) (describing what a significantly less favorable judgement is). 
169. Cf. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Neil Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: 
A Preliminary Report, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 18 (1988) (describing the analogous dangers and 
problems seen by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68). 
170. Cf. Stacy Williams & Gregory F. Burch, Texas’ New Fee-Shifting Statute, 24 THE ADVOC. 18, 
19 (2003) (comparing the differing power structures between wealthy and indigent clients); Napier, 
supra note 58, at A17 (describing the similar negative effects seen by the English rule). 
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Most plaintiffs, on the other hand, bare significant personal risk when 
deciding to reject settlement offers covered by Chapter 42.  Not only would 
they be required to pay their own attorney’s fees and litigation costs, but 
they would have to do so for the other side as well—despite prevailing.  
Insult would be added to injury as these fees and costs increase due to 
extended litigation spent on figuring up what are considered reasonable 
attorney’s fees.   
All this considered, it is easy to see how indigent clients in Texas might 
be led to accept settlement offers out of fear rather than a true meeting of 
the minds.  An attorney who is confident that he or she can win an award 
beyond a 20% margin to a settlement offer would be better enabled to 
convince their client to hold out if they were able to guarantee these 
statutorily imposed adverse attorney’s fees.  Despite claimants getting a 20% 
margin of error, “case evaluations by parties and their attorneys often lack 
exact precision.”171  Though these fees can only be used as an offset to a 
prevailing plaintiff’s award, they have the ability to swallow up a large 
percentage of a victorious claimant’s award.172   
The harsh effects of the English system have previously been discussed 
in this Comment.  These fee-shifting statutes are an erosion of the American 
system of recovery and pose real risks to indigent clients.  Just as the English 
system does, these statutes may very well exclude plaintiffs from access to 
justice for fear of having to pay the other side’s costs.173  For many indigent 
plaintiffs this added cost could prove too discouraging, thus preventing 
otherwise meritorious claims from being brought to the court.  Many sister 
state jurisdictions have fee-shifting statutes, thus making these inherent 
threats to poorer plaintiffs a national phenomenon.174   
Allowing attorneys to guarantee shifting attorney’s fees is a viable way of 
striking balance between the English and American systems.  Defendants 
would still be incentivized to make reasonable offers of settlement with the 
prospect of remuneration of costs upon rejection while plaintiffs would be 
 
171. Sherman, supra note 58, at 1887–88. 
172. Cf. Rowe, Jr. & Vidmar, supra note 165, at 18 (describing the analogous dangers and 
problems seen by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of 
Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 168–69 (1984) (predicting negative effects of 
implementing fee-shifting arrangements). 
173. Napier, supra note 58, at A17; see Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule, 78 ABA J. 54, 57 
(1992) (discussing the financial impact the English system has on meritorious plaintiffs). 
174. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (creating a federal procedure for fee-shifting); see also Carlson, supra 
note 159, at 104 n.11 (detailing the various other states with some form of fee-shifting statute). 
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insulated from the threats of low-ball offers.  This type of practice should 
once again come down to informed consent between client and counsel 
rather than a carte blanche violation of ethics rules.  The situations and 
motivations of settlement negotiation are often nuanced, and so too should 
be an attorney’s ability to respond to them.  Under the current Texas Rules 
of Professional Conduct, clients involved in Rule 167 negotiations face a 
difficult decision either way.   
In exchange for higher contingency percentages, attorneys would be 
better enabled to convince clients that their case is worth substantially more 
than what the other side is offering.  Clients who fail to get beyond the 
statutory margins could simply receive an offset from their attorney should 
they still prevail at court despite receiving a lower-than-expected award.175  
It is entirely admitted that this might put attorneys at odds with the will of 
the government by hindering settlement.  However, it would still be the 
attorney who bears the risk of his intervention, not the client.   
D. Expense of Litigation 
When considering the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct 
in unison, the most logical solution to the issue of whether an attorney can 
ethically guarantee the threat of adverse attorney’s fee awards comes down 
to the nature of the expense.  In a more simplistic Occam’s Razor176 style 
solution, counselors can turn once again to Rule 1.08(d) to find illumination.  
Under the current Texas rules an attorney is allowed to guarantee the 
“expenses of litigation[,] . . . the repayment of which may be contingent on 
the outcome of the matter.”177  And for indigent clients no repayment is 
necessary at all.178   
And while it is still true that attorney’s fees are generally unrecoverable in 
Texas absent a contractual or statutory provision,179 this is not always the 
 
175. In jurisdictions such as California, which allows for defendants to actually recover costs 
from losing plaintiffs, the guaranteeing of shifting attorney’s fees would better support the public policy 
goals behind contingent fee agreements.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5. 
176. Made in reference to the oft quoted fourteeth century maxim “the simpler explanation of 
an entity is to be preferred.” Occam’s Razor, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica. 
com/topic/Occams-razor [https://perma.cc/272R-P3VN]. 
177. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(d)(1), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A. 
178. See id. at R. 1.08(d)(2) (allowing an indigent’s attorney to cover attorney’s fees and litigation 
costs on behalf of client). 
179. Baja Energy, Inc. v. Ball, 669 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1984, no writ) (citing 
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1967)). 
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case.  There are instances of Texas and federal180 courts allowing attorney’s 
fees to be considered expenses of litigation.  The Texas Supreme Court has 
emphatically stated in Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds181 that “Texas law is clear 
that attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the prosecution or defense of a 
claim, although ‘compensatory in that they help make a claimant whole,’ are 
not damages.”182  And though the court in Ortiz relied on the general rule 
of recovery stated in New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Texas Industries, Inc.,183 
the court has stated, in the interim of those two cases, in Akin, Gump, Strauss, 
Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. National Development & Research Corp.184 that “[o]ur 
statement, considered without reference to the facts of the case, could be 
read out of context as generally precluding recovery of attorney’s fees for 
prosecuting or defending a suit.  It was not intended to extend so far.”185   
Thus, recovering attorney’s fees as a matter of course should not be 
classified as damages.  Instead, where statute permits, adverse attorney’s fees 
ought to be considered part of the costs and expenses of litigation.186  All 
things considered, a strong argument exists that adverse187 attorney’s fees 
are firmly within the class of expenses which Rules 1.08(d)(1) and (2) permit 
the guarantee of.  Once again there is no clear bright-line answer to the 
 
180. See S. Nat. Bank of Houston v. Crateo, 458 F.2d 688, 698 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying the Erie 
doctrine with Texas law, allowing the award of attorney’s fees as an expense of litigation on principle, 
but reversed for the trial court to determine the reasonable amount.). 
181. Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2019) (rehearing denied Dec. 13, 2019). 
182. Id. at 135 (quoting In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 173 (Tex. 2013)); 
see In Re Xerox Corp., 555 S.W.3d 518, 529 (Tex. 2018) (defining damages as a compensation for a 
loss); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Forte, 497 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. 2016) (explaining that compensatory 
damages are not the same as civil penalties, especially in light of TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
ch. 41); Huff v. Fid. Union Life Ins. Co., 312 S.W.2d 493, 501 (Tex. 1958) (treating attorney’s fees 
awards as more of a penalty than an actual damages claim); Sherrick v. Wyland, 37 S.W. 345, 345 (Tex. 
Civ App. 1896, no writ) (“[F]ees of counsel, incurred in prosecuting a suit for or defending against a 
wrong, are not ordinarily recoverable as actual damages, because they are not considered proximate 
results of such wrong.”). 
183. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1967). 
184. Akin, Gump, Straus, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat’l Dev. & Rsch. Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106 
(Tex. 2009). 
185. Id. at 120. 
186. This position applies to attorney’s fee awards that are not treated as damages by statute.  
See James M. Stanton, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 243, 248–49 (2004) (reviewing the exceptions Texas 
courts recognize to the American rule that both parties pay for its own court costs “unless provided 
for by statute or by contract between the parties . . . .”). 
187. It must be noted that the ethical legitimacy of the practice being recommended in this 
Comment does not apply to one’s own attorney’s fees.  These have already been provided for by statute 
and are regulated by the rules of professional conduct.  TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.04, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A. 
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question presented that can be found in case law or statutes.  Not only is 
guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees an incredibly rare—or completely 
nonexistent—practice in Texas, it is one that is equally rare in other states.  
Authority on this issue is sparse, and indirect at best.  That said, lack of 
scholarship on the issue should not be deemed adequate grounds for 
dismissing the importance of the question presented.   
The very same ethical requirements that pertain to all contingent fee 
agreements would still apply to guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fee 
awards.188  Any fee that an attorney guaranteed would still have to be 
conscionable.189  The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct 
prohibit the charging of unreasonable fees.190  But the practice of 
guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees is in fact the exact opposite—the client 
does not get charged these fees.  Whatever extra award percentage an 
attorney would get from this extra risk would still need to be conscionable 
under the rules.  So long as a competent lawyer can form “a reasonable belief 
that the fee is reasonable” there is no conflict with Rule 1.04.191  The rule 
gives us multiple reasonableness factors that we may consider when 
analyzing any type of fee.192   
Nothing about guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees would negatively 
impact the time and labor required,193 the skill required to carry out the 
legal work correctly,194 or the difficulty and novelty of the questions 
involved.195  Guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fee awards would in no way 
lead to a rise of conflicts of interests.196  The amount of attorney’s fees to 
be guaranteed would be on a case-by-case basis, and thus would be unlikely 
to raise the overall percentage “customarily charged in the locality for similar 
legal services[.]”197  However, like any contingency fee agreement, the 
contingent nature of the adverse attorney’s fee award guarantee and the 
 
188. Id. at R. 1.08(d). 
189. Id. at R. 1.04. 
190. Id. at R. 1.04(a) (requiring that all contingent fee agreements be conscionable). 
191. Id. (“A fee is unconscionable if a competent lawyer could not form a reasonable belief that 
the fee is reasonable”). 
192. Id. at R. 1.04(b). 
193. Id. at R. 1.04(b)(1). 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at R. 1.04(b)(2). 
197. Id. at R. 1.04(b)(3). 
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necessary events to trigger the contingency198 should be laid out in 
writing.199   
Looking at the situation realistically, should a client be assessed adverse 
attorney’s fees they must pay them either way.  This practice would not 
change this.  However, if these adverse attorney’s fees were treated as an 
offset to a client’s own attorney’s fees in an “unsuccessful outcome,”200 it 
would better serve the interests of the client if they did not have to end up 
paying two sets of attorney’s fees.  If an attorney is comfortable with risking 
a lower payout due to an offset of adverse attorney’s fees this should be left 
up to them.  This is the way in which contingent fee agreements are handled 
in Alabama.  In 1995, the Alabama Supreme Court amended their equivalent 
to Texas Rule 1.08 to expressly provide that in a percentage award fee 
agreement “a lawyer may pay, for his own account, court costs and expenses 
of litigation.  The fee paid to the attorney from the proceeds of the action 
may include an amount equal to such costs and expenses incurred.”201   
The higher the total adverse attorney award, the less money that ends up 
in the pockets of the plaintiff.  Guaranteeing these adverse attorney’s fees, 
and treating them as an offset of one’s own fees as an expense of litigation 
simply allows plaintiffs to keep at least some measurable remainder of their 
awards.  However, it is important to note that the increased percentage for 
successful actions involving the threat of adverse attorney’s fees should not 
be greater than the actual percentage that adverse attorney’s fees would be 
of the plaintiff’s award, i.e., if the adverse attorney’s fees were 5% of the 
overall award the plaintiff’s attorney should not be allowed to charge much 
more than 5% extra for taking on this risk.  The issue becomes predicting 
what the percentage of adverse fees will be at the offset.  However, language 
to the effect of “such additional fee shall not be ___% higher than what the 
actual reasonable expenses of the opposing side shall be” could serve as a 
possible example of how to contract around this issue.   
 
198. Id. at R. 1.04(b)(8). 
199. Id. at R. 1.04(c). 
200. Here the term “unsuccessful” requires a looser meaning than what it is typical.  Unlike in 
normal contingent-fee agreements, which assess success based on whether the defendant is found 
liable, the term “success” here can be more mailable.  Success can be determined by a certain pecuniary 
threshold that a client wishes to reach, or even an adverse attorney’s fee award figure that they wish to 
avoid. 
201. Joseph W. Blackburn, Deductibility of Litigation Expenses Paid by Alabama Attorney’s, 67 ALA. 
LAW. 445, 447 (2006). 
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As with any other fee, attorneys would not be allowed to use the 
guaranteeing of adverse attorney’s fees as a means to solicit prospective 
clients through advertising.202  Attorney’s would still be prohibited from 
utilizing any sort of practice that constitutes barratry under the laws of the 
State of Texas.203  While it is true that under the current Texas rules 
repayment is required, this has not always been the case.  The Texas rule is 
already more forgiving in its scope than the ABA equivalent.204  Unlike 
many states, the Texas rules expressly include the ability to guarantee the 
expenses of litigation for any client, regardless of ability to pay.205   
As for indigent clients, Texas—as well as most states—do not require 
that advanced expenses of litigation be repaid.206  The practical impact of 
treating adverse attorney’s fee awards as an expense of litigation would be 
that indigent clients would be completely insulated from risk in a contingent 
situation.  The drafters of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional 
Conduct207, as well as the Model Code of Professional Conduct208, 
acknowledged this.   
 
202. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.03 (regulating the manner in which 
attorneys are allowed to solicit clients and prohibiting an exchange of anything of value to gain 
prospective clients except in very limited situations). 
203. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.04(a)(9) (stating that a lawyer shall 
not “engage in conduct that constitutes barratry”). 
204. See Robert P. Schuwerk & John F. Sutton, Jr., A Guide to The Texas Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 27A HOUS. L. REV. 1, 136 (1990) (dissecting the complexities of the Texas 
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct). 
205. Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(d)(1) (“[A] lawyer may 
advance or guarantee court costs, expenses of litigation or administrative proceedings, and reasonably 
necessary medical and living expenses, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of 
the matter.”), with ARIZ. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(1) (“[A] lawyer may advance court costs 
and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.”), 
and COLO. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(1) (“[A] lawyer may advance court costs and expenses 
of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.”), and FLORIDA 
RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.8(e)(1) (“[A] lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of 
litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.”), and KY. RULES 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.130(1.8)(e)(1) (“[A] lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, 
the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.”). 
206. Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(d)(2) (“[A] lawyer 
representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.”), 
with ALA. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2) (“[A] lawyer representing an indigent client may pay 
court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.”), and ARIZ. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.8(e)(2) (“[A] lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation 
on behalf of the client.”), and COLO. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2) (“[A] lawyer representing 
an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client”). 
207. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(d)(2). 
208. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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Ethically there is little ground to support the notion that allowing adverse 
attorney’s fees to be guaranteed as a cost of litigation would somehow lead 
to a rise in predatory contingent fee agreements.  Ethical attorneys who take 
the risk of guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees create two types of scenarios: 
(1) the attorney would be more likely to counsel their clients on a losing case 
to reach settlement; (2) the attorney would be even more incentivized to win 
the case.  Neither of these scenarios compromises the ethics of an attorney’s 
actions under the rules.  Conspiracy fears that this would further fuel the 
fires of drawn-out litigation are based in conjecture rather than concrete 
data.  What is concrete however, is that the expenses of litigation all too 
often keep meritorious cases from ever seeing the light of a courtroom 
because one of the parties is terrified of the economic impacts of litigation.   
VI.    THE REAL-WORLD IMPACT AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Having established the philosophical and somewhat arcane209 
foundation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, a more 
pragmatic approach would help provide a broader analysis of the subject.  It 
is all good and well to demonstrate the historical roots of the argument 
proposed, but this does little to further the likelihood of use by practicing 
attorneys.  The practice of guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees is a subject 
which has little to no scholarship before now.  An attorney wishing to utilize 
the practice has little to go on to keep from landing in front of a disciplinary 
board.   
A. Eliminate or Reduce Third-Party Litigation Financing 
Allowing counselors to guarantee adverse attorney’s fees awards will 
hopefully reduce or eliminate all or part of the market for third-party 
litigation financing.  Since the inception of the Texas rules an entire industry 
of private lenders for litigation costs has sprung up, with estimated output 
totaling in excess of $1 billion loaned out to plaintiffs alone.210  It is true 
that similar to contingent fee agreements private third-party financing allows 
plaintiffs who otherwise would not be able to afford legal fees the 
 
209. While it is true that discussing the Magna Carta and the Texas rules in the same context 
might be a bit esoteric, this only goes to show just how ancient the values embodied in this paper’s 
argument are.  A deep river of history flows throughout the body of this proposal, and the goal of 
opening the doors of justice to all who have a worthy cause lie at the heart of it.   
210. George J. Lysaught & D. Scott Hazelgrove, Economic Implication of Third-Party Litigation 
Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice System, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 645 (2012). 
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opportunity to pay for an attorney.211  However, unlike contingent fee 
agreements with attorneys there are few, if any, ethical considerations 
enforced upon lenders to protect clients.  Instead of involving the ethical, 
moral, and fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship, clients are 
turning more and more towards arm’s-length transactions with lending 
institutions who value profit over results.   
An attorney’s first and most solemn interest is always that of the client.  
And allowing them to hop in bed with a sparsely regulated,212 self-
interested business to be able bring suit is a betrayal of that obligation when 
there is a more equitable solution within our grasp.  Texas Disciplinary Rule 
of Professional Conduct 1.04 already bars attorneys from taking advantage 
of their clients.  These lenders on the other hand are not subject to 
Rule 1.04.  There is little to keep third-party financiers from taking 
advantage of clients in their contracts to pay back their loans with a 
percentage of their awards.  Meanwhile, duties separately owed to clients by 
their attorney will always be a greater protection than individual regulations.  
Furthermore, if an attorney takes their percentage of the award and the bank 
takes theirs, what is there really left to make the client whole?  This 
Comment has highlighted the fact that under the American system the 
parties are not completely made whole.  Allowing third-party litigation 
financiers to take part of client’s awards further exacerbate the situation—
not to mention it is a near textbook definition of champerty.   
B. Amend the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct 
One possible way of creating a solution is to amend the Texas Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  Hopefully this Comment has proven that 
guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees is ethical—now it must be legal as well.  
Adding in a provision in Rule 1.08(d)(1) to allow for this is one possible 
path, and one that ought to be given strong consideration.  If one takes a 
practical look at the term “expense of litigation,” how could attorney’s fees 
not be part of it?  The Model Rules allow the advancement of expenses of 
litigation because “the advances are practically indistinguishable from 
contingent fees and help ensure access to the courts.”213  Thus, changing 
 
211. Id. at 646. 
212. See e.g., Susan L. Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be 
Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 57 (2004) (highlighting the fact the entire 
litigation finance industry is unregulated). 
213. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021). 
  
2021] Comment 221 
the Texas rules requires great consideration by the drafters of the State Bar.  
However, incorporating language to fix one problem might create another. 
C. Texas Commission on Professional Ethics 
The more prudent option might well be within the power of the Texas 
Commission on Professional Ethics.  Should a case involving these issues 
come before the Commission, it would be possible for that body to simply 
state that the suggested practice of guaranteeing a client’s adverse attorney’s 
fees comports with the Texas rules.  This would avoid having to go through 
the effort and risk involved in changing the Texas Rules of Professional 
Conduct themselves.  
VII.    CONCLUSION 
Allowing attorneys to guarantee all or a portion of any adverse attorney’s 
fees awarded against their client is an ethical solution to many problems.  
Chief among these solutions is the expansion of the open courts doctrine to 
worthy claimants.  The sanctity of contract law ought to prevail in an 
otherwise ethical situation, and Texas should make it clear that this practice 
is ethical.  Those who would subvert the ethical parameters of contingent 
fee agreements would likely do so all the same without addition of any 
guarantees of adverse attorney’s fees to the state rules.  This is something 
the bar is already equipped to handle, and it is a legitimate issue.  However, 
the bigger problem involved is that otherwise meritorious parties either 
forego bringing suit or accept a settlement out of fear of the costs and 
expenses of litigation.  What good is reaching the marble rooms of justice if 
you are quickly forced out of them by pecuniary limitations?  Guaranteeing 
the threat of adverse attorney’s fees is a legitimate and practical means of 
assisting clients to navigate the financially murky waters of litigation and 
should be widely accepted.   
